In my article "berkeley's master argument" I attempt to show that an argument berkeley uses in the 'dialogues' and 'principles' to support his contention that whatever is perceivable is perceived can be seen as an illuminating attempt to relate conceptualizing, Imaging and perceiving. In consequence it cannot be dismissed as resting on an elementary fallacy, But reflects on the conditions for the self ascription of experience.

The philosophy problem of identity and the related problem of change go back to the ancient Greek philosophers and fascinated later figures including Leibniz, Locke and Hume. Heraclitus argued that one could not swim in the same river twice because new waters were ever flowing in. When is a river not the same river? If one removes one plank at a time when is a ship no longer a ship? What is the basic nature of identity and persistence? This book (...) introduces and asseses the philosophical puzzles posed by things persisting through time. Beginning with essential historical background to the problem it explores the following key topics and debates: mereology and identity, including 'Leibniz's Law' the constitution view of identity the 'relative identity' argument concerning identity temporary identity four-dimensionalism, counterpart and mulitiple counterpart theory supervenience the problem of temporary intrinsics the necessity of identity presentism ontological and epistemological criteria for persistence and the difference between them. Including chapter summaries, annotated further reading and a glossary this book is essential reading for anyone seeking a clear and informative introduction to and assessement of the metaphysics of identity. (shrink)

In _The Immaterial_,_ _French social philosopher André Gorz argues, in his finely-tuned and polemical style, that the economic boom that accelerated in the 1990s and crashed so spectacularly in 2008 was based largely on an immaterial consumption of symbols and ideas, as capitalism tried to overcome the crisis of the formally industrial regime by throwing itself into a new, so-called knowledge economy. In this, the last full-length theoretical work Gorz completed before his death, he argues instead for the creation (...) of a true knowledge economy. This economy would be based on zero-cost exchange and pooled resources, and knowledge would be treated as humanity’s common property. Currently, in order to exploit knowledge and turn it into capital, the capitalist enterprise privatizes specialized knowledge and claims ownership through private licenses and copyright. But as Gorz shows, the traditional foundations of such capitalist economics have begun to crumble because of the immaterial nature of this new form of product, which makes it almost impossible to measure in monetary terms. The knowledge economy, Gorz declares, _is_ the crisis of capitalism. Thought-provoking and divisive, _The Immaterial _is the perfect book for our time, as we begin to reimagine the structures of our economic system in order to rebuild and move forward. “It is to Gorz... that readers should turn for a compelling combination of sharp analysis, well-wrought polemic, and suggestions for the future.”—_Red Pepper_ “A great figure of the intellectual Left.”—Nicolas Sarkozy “Gorz’s intelligence strikes you at the very first glance: it is one of the nimblest, acutest intelligences I know.”—Jean-Paul Sartre. (shrink)

Trata-se de capítulo de um livro sobre a noção de "substância" na história da filosofia e contém uma discussão sobre a noção ordinária de "corpo" do ponto de vista da filosofia analítica.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Was Hume An Atheist? Shane Andre Hume's philosophy of religion, as expressed in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, the Natural History of Religion, and sections 10 and 11 ofthe Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding,1 invites a number of diverse interpretations. At one extreme are those who see Hume as an "atheist"2 or "anti-theist."3 At the other extreme are those who see Hume as some kind of theist, though not a classical (...) or orthodox one.4 In between are others for whom Hume is an "agnostic* or "ironic skeptic."6 Still a fourth interpretation can be found, according to which Hume "seems to vacillate hopelessly" in his view ofreligion;7 in other words, no coherent philosophy ofreligion can be found in his work and so it is futile to look for one. Ofthe four alternatives, it seems to me that the fourth, being less interesting philosophically and less to Hume's credit as a major philosopher, should be rejected unless by default no coherent case can be made for one of the other three. Since I believe that Hume's views about the nature and existence of God are complex, somewhat unconventional, but still coherent, I will concentrate on the title question. Before tackling that question directly, however, we need to clarify the meaning of the term "atheist" and its cognates. While an atheist is popularly defined as one who does not believe in God, this definition is inadequate for two reasons. First, while the absence of belief is sometimes treated as a synonym for disbelief, it is clear that the two are not the same. An infant does not believe in God, but that does not make him an atheist,8 for, as yet, he does not have the linguistic competence to reflect on the question, Does God exist? Neither is the agnostic an atheist, for, though he has reflected on the question, he has not found reason to answer it affirmatively, Uke the theist, or negatively, like the atheist. For this reason, the atheist must be characterized more strongly, as one who disbelieves that God exists. But even this stronger characterization is insufficient, for, as is well-known but perhaps less widely takeninto account, there are many different conceptions ofGod, ranging from monotheism to polytheism, from beUef in a perfect being to belief in a being who shares some human limitations, from deism to pantheism, and so on. Accordingly, it has become commonplace in philosophy to recognize at least two senses ofthe term "God": a narrow sense, signifying "a supremely good being, creator of but separate from and independent of the world, omnipotent, omniscient, eternal and self-existent";9 and a wide sense, Volume XLX Number 1 141 SHANE ANDRE signifying one or more divine beings, personal or otherwise, manifesting extraordinarybut perhaps not superlative properties. For short, we could call the narrow sense the standard concept ofGod, and beliefin the existence ofsuch a being standard theism.10 And we could call the broad sense, applicable to any concept of the divine, the extended concept of God, and belief in the existence of such a being(s) extendedtheism. On this account, standard theists will alsobe extended theists, but of course someone could be an extended theist without being a standard theist. Let us call such a person (for example, Epicurus, who denied, not that the Gods exist, but that they intervene in human affairs) a limited theist. It is important to note that the limited theist rejects standard theism but is not an atheist simpliciter. How does recognition of these different forms oftheism affect our understanding of atheism? There seem to be two major possibilities. One is to characterize atheism in the narrow sense as disbeUef in standard theism; the other is to characterize it in the broad sense as disbeliefin any form of theism, including limited theism. While either option is open, it seems to me that the latter is preferable. For ifwe say that anyone who rejects standard theism is an atheist, we will end up with the paradoxical result that many distinguished theists will turn out to be atheists. For example, while Charles Hartshorne is not a standard theist, insofar as he rejects the... (shrink)

The objective of this article is to try to elucidate Wittgenstein’s ex-travagant thesis that each and every mathematical advancement involves some “semantical mutation”, i.e., some alteration of the very meanings of the terms involved. To do that we will argue in favor of the idea of a “modal incompati-bility” between the concepts involved, as they were prior to the advancement, and what they become after the new result was obtained. We will also argue that the adoption of this thesis profoundly (...) alters the traditional way of con-struing the idea of “progress” in mathematics. (shrink)

Pierre André,Michel Bourban | : Dans un contexte d’urgence, les philosophes ne peuvent plus se contenter d’élaborer des théories idéales de la justice climatique fondées sur des motivations purement morales. Il est désormais nécessaire d’envisager des approches non idéales. Nous proposons ici de prendre au sérieux le problème de la motivation à l’action et nous mettons en avant certains motifs prudentiels pour lutter contre le changement climatique, en vue non pas de remplacer, mais de renforcer les motivations morales existantes, (...) mais insuffisantes. Nous commençons par présenter trois grandes approches idéales qui ont prévalu jusqu’ici dans la recherche sur la justice climatique et sont fondées respectivement sur l’éthique déontologique, sur l’éthique des vertus et sur l’utilitarisme. Nous mettons en évidence leurs limites pratiques, en ciblant le problème de la motivation à l’action. Nous proposons ensuite quelques pistes pour résoudre ce problème en esquissant une approche non idéale de la justice climatique. Cette approche est centrée sur les motivations amorales ressortant de l’examen attentif des perturbations systémiques globales et des contextes nationaux et locaux spécifiques. Elle est à notre sens incontournable pour motiver les États-nations, les entreprises et les individus. Il s’agit cependant moins de la substituer totalement aux théories idéales de la justice climatique que de compléter celles-ci pour établir une vision plus compréhensive qui distingue le problème de la justification morale de celui de la motivation. | : In a situation of urgency, philosophers can no longer rely exclusively on ideal theories of climate justice grounded on purely moral motives. It has become necessary to build nonideal approaches. We propose to give serious consideration to the problem of motivation to act by putting forward some prudential reasons for tackling climate change—with the aim not of replacing existing but inadequate moral motivations, but of strengthening them. First, we identify three major ideal approaches that have so far prevailed in climate justice research, grounded respectively on deontological ethics, on virtue ethics, and on utilitarianism. We highlight their practical limitations, particularly with regards to the problem of motivation to act. Second, we open the way for an alternative nonideal approach to climate justice based on amoral motivations issuing from a careful examination of global systemic disruptions as well as of specific national and local situations. This approach cannot be ignored if one wishes to motivate nation-states, corporations, and individuals to act. However, our goal is not to replace ideal theory with nonideal theory, but rather to complete the former with the latter for a more comprehensive account of climate justice that distinguishes the problem of moral justification from the problem of motivation. (shrink)

Labour and employment law no longer has a monopoly on regulating labour relations and is facing a crisis as its effectiveness is questioned. Codes of conduct adopted by companies to recognise their social responsibility for the global supply chain are instruments that can usefully complement labour and employment law. The aim of this paper is to analyse in depth the legal nature of codes of conduct and their impact on labour and employment law. Will the use of codes of conduct (...) reinforce the crisis of labour and employment law in the era of globalisation or will these codes be part of a solution to this crisis? Do we have to consider codes of conduct as competitors to labour and employment law or as an opportunity for rethinking the way that labour and employment law norms should be produced and applied? (shrink)

This paper offers a new interpretation for Wittgenstein`s treatment of mathematical identities. As it is widely known, Wittgenstein`s mature philosophy of mathematics includes a general rejection of abstract objects. On the other hand, the traditional interpretation of mathematical identities involves precisely the idea of a single abstract object – usually a number –named by both sides of an equation.

Many theists conceive of God as a perfect being, i.e., as that than which none greater is metaphysically possible. On this grand view of God, it seems plausible to think that such a supreme and maximally great being would not be subject to luck of any sort. Given the divine perfections, God is completely insulated from luck. However, I argue that the opposite is true: precisely because God is perfect, he is subject to a kind of luck called constitutive luck. (...) In this paper, first I provide an analysis of luck and then explain the concept of constitutive luck. I proceed to defend constitutive luck from charges of incoherence and examine a different approach to make sense of this luck. Furthermore, I distinguish between two kinds of constitutive luck and argue that even if God isn’t subject to one kind, evading the second kind is unsuccessful. I offer two ways that God is constitutively lucky and reach a surprising conclusion: a perfect being is the luckiest of all possible beings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:370 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Leibniz. By Edmondo Clone. (Napoli : Libreria scientifica editrice. Pp. 540. L.4.000.) L'ouvrage d'E. Cione est une presentation d'ensemble de l'oeuvre de Leibniz. L'auteur situe d'abord Leibniz dans son milieu culturel et dans son ambiance historique. Puis il aborde les probl~mes relatifs ~ la monade et ~ l'univers. Une troisi~me partie traite du choix divin, du real et des possibles. La quatri~me s'attache au difficile (...) probl~me de la liberte~ en Dieu et dans l'homme. Enfin, Clone precise queles sont et doivent ~tre les activite~s de l'homme dans los domaines de la logique, de la morale, de l'esth~tique, de la religion. Par consequent, ne serait-que par l'ampleur des mati~res ~tudi~es, on dispose ici d'une vaste fresque qui met en place l'ensemble des preoccupations philosophiques de Leibniz, et qui d~ploie son ~ventail en un certain sens, disons celui de la Monadologie, toute entree dans la philosophie de Leibniz ~tant bonne, pourvu, si j'ose dire, qu'on en sorte. Or, on en sort, car l'au~eur appuie ses connaissanc~s sur une pratique quotidienne des ~extes de Leibniz, sur une documentation de premiere main qui lui fair honneur, sur une somme de lectures [eibniziennes qui l'aident s orienter son dessein. Cet ouvrage repose sur l'humus fertile d'un vaste savoir technique et livresque concernant la philosophic de Leibniz. I1 est donc, de ce point de vue, document~ avec pr4cision, et il atteint le fond des probl~mes abord4s. Enfin, rauteur ne perd pas ses propres droits dans cette ~tude, et pr4cise d'un oeil vigilant quelles sont es d4fectuositds de cette pens4e, qui n'a sa pleine signification que si on ne la coupe pas de sos racines th4ologiques. I1 semble que lh, le destin de Leibniz diff~re de celui de Clone, puisque, pour ce dernier, le philosophe d'Hanovre ne parvient pas ~ p4n~trer le sens profond de la r~alit(~ spirituelle, c'est-h-dire de la libert4 de l'homme. ANDRE ROBINET Orldans, France David Hume: Prophet o] the Counter-Revolution. By Laurence L. Bongie. (Oxford University Press, 1965. Pp. xvii + 182.35s.) This excellent work uncovers and analyzes the amazing influence of Hume's historical and political views on the world of late 18th-century France. First Professor Bongie admirably recounts the immense impact of Hume's History o] England in France when it originally appeared. The work was wildly praised by French royalty, by the philosophes, by Catholic intellectuals, by almost everyone except the Huguenot exiles. Hume's alleged impartiality and philosophical approach made him for France of the time, the finest historian of the age, the new Tacitus. Everyone found great profundity in the History, and each group managed to overlook those aspects of Hume's views that conflicted with their own outlook, and stressed those aspects that fitted in with their own predilections. it was Turgot who apparently first realized that Hume was not the zeal hero of those who were to transform France, and that Hume's political philosophy and his picture of human nature "glean'd" through the study of history were hardly in accord with the theories of the reformers and the future revolutionists. In their correspondence, Hume and Turgot revealed the enormous gulf that separated them, the latter believing in the endless perfectibility of mankind, the former, much more sceptical and much readier to accept man in his historical condition. For Hume, there was always a struggle between order and liberty, and dangers on both sides with no ideal solution in sight, while for the optimistic Turgot a new and better world was just around the corner. What Turgot saw as their differences became clearer a few years later to moderates like Mirabeau, Mably and Brissot. Hume, for them, did not really see the importance of liberty, the fundamental rights of man, the real lessons of History. The moderates began boosting, translating and commenting on an antidote to Hume's History, the liberal Whig version of English history by Catherine Macaulay-Graham, a work finally published in French under Mirabeau... (shrink)

A. Selbstverortung: Der hermssche Blick auf andere Religionen -- b. Öffnung zu Anderen: Das Problem geschlossener Rationalitätsformen -- ii. Einheit in der Vielfalt. Die interpretative Vernunft -- III. 3.C. Schlussfolgerungen. Bildung der Weltanschauungen -- IV. Ergebnisse und Ausblicke -- IV. 1. Perspektiven des Theorievergleichs -- IV. 1.A. Eine 'Topik der Verständigung' - als Struktur der Forschungsfragen -- IV. 1.B. Vernunft und Religion als komplementäre Konkurrenz -- IV. 2. Möglichkeiten interkultureller Koexistenz -- IV. 2.A. Evangelischer Glaube im Horizont des globalen Wandels (...) -- IV. 2.B. Diskurskultur und Diskurs der Kulturen -- IV. 2.C. Konstitutionalisierung der Wirkungsgemeinschaft der Menschheit -- Bibliografie -- Literatur von Jürgen Habermas -- Literatur von Eilert Herms -- Weitere Literatur -- Personenregister -- Sachregister. (shrink)

nombreux textes inédits André Robinet. 2. LE SECOND MEMBRE DE LA DISJONCTION ARCHITECTONIQUE (D2): LES AUTOMATES SYSTÉMIQUES ( 1686-1716) Le discours leibnizien dans (v>4) emprunte la voie d'une communication qui ...

O presente artigo tem como tema as extensas discussões de Wittgenstein sobre uma das formas mais simples e elementares de infinitude em matemática: as dízimas periódicas. Tentamos organizar os vários argumentos do autor em uma única exposição continuada. No final do artigo, introduzimos, ainda que de forma breve, o famoso argumento sobre “execução de regras” de Wittgenstein, bem como a idéia de interpretações nãostandard de processos infinitos.

This paper deals with the recent Swedish proposals of a Intuitionistic notion of Truth, by Dag Prawitz and Per Martin-Löf.

The objective of this paper will be to present a critical evaluation of the so-called “standard conception of a proof”. According to this conception, a text could only be called a “demonstration of a certain mathematical proposition” if we could find a completely formalized version of that demonstration, its “corresponding formal proof”. We will compare these ideas with the treatment of the same topic within two markedly different contexts, that of contemporary Swedish intuitionism and that of modern software engineering. Finally, (...) we will offer a quick discussion of some of Wittgenstein's proposals regarding the subject. /// -/- O objetivo deste texto será o de apresentar uma avaliação crítica da assim chamada “concepção estândar” do que seja uma prova. Segundo essa concepção, um texto só poderia ser chamado de uma “demonstração de uma certa proposição matemática” se pudéssemos encontrar uma versão completamente formalizada daquela demonstração, sua “prova formal correspondente”. Faremos comparações com o tratamento do mesmo tópico em dois contextos muito distintos, aquele do intuicionismo sueco contemporâneo e o da moderna engenharia de software. Por fim, faremos uma rápida apresentação de algumas propostas de Wittgenstein sobre o assunto. (shrink)

This paper offers a reconstruction of Wittgenstein's discussion on inductive proofs. A "algebraic version" of these indirect proofs is offered and contrasted with the usual ones in which an infinite sequence of modus pones is projected.

This paper presents a new reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s famous (and controversial) rule-following arguments. Two are the novel features offered by our reconstruction. In the first place, we propose a shift of the central focus of the discussion, from the general semantics and the philosophy of mind to the philosophy of mathematics and the rejection of the notion of a function. The second new feature is positive: we argue that Wittgenstein offers us a new alternative notion of a rule (to replace (...) the rejected functions), a notion reminiscent of Category Theory’s notion of a morphism. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics involves two highly controversial theses: the idea that mathematical propositions are not about (abstract) objects and the idea that no mathematical conjecture is ever answered as such, because the advent of the proof always determines a semantical shift of the meanings of the terms involved in the conjecture. The present article offers a reconstruction of Wittgenstein’s arguments supporting these theses within a very restricted setting: Archimedes’ discovery of an algorithm for calculating the number Pi.

Este artigo oferece uma nova reconstrução para os argumentos do famoso segundo capítulo de Word and Object de Quine e sua idéia da Tradução Radical . De acordo com essa abordagem, o maior alvo de Quine é a noção de composicionalidade como sendo o elemento fundamental para qualquer teoria do significado. Em poucas palavras, não poderia haver nenhuma “teoria do significado”, para Quine, simplesmente porque a noção de composicionalidade deveria ser rejeitada como a concepção central da semântica. Além disso, tomamos (...) o cuidado de diferenciar argumentos empíricos de argumentos a priori de natureza modal. Esses últimos constituem-se no que propomos chamar de Teorema do Automorfismo de Quine , a idéia de que há maneiras alternativas de se reconstruir a estrutura gramatical de qualquer língua incluindo predicação e que poderiam manter invariantes todas as nossas predisposições para comportamento verbal sob quaisquer estados de coisas, atuais ou meramente possíveis. Em nosso entender, é esse teorema que determina fundamentalmente a rejeição da composicionalidade por Quine e, assim, de todas as teorias do significado. (shrink)

This article discusses some of Chateaubriand’s views on the connections between the ideas of formalization and infinity, as presented in chapters 19 and 20 of Logical Forms. We basically agree with his criticisms of the standard construal of these connections, a view we named “formal proofs as ultimate provings”, but we suggest an alternative way of picturing that connection based on some ideas of the late Wittgenstein.

O objetivo deste artigo é tentarmos elucidar a extravagante tese de Wittgenstein de que todo e qualquer avanço matemático envolve alguma “mutação semântica”, ou seja, alguma alteração nos próprios significados dos termos envolvidos. Para isso, argumentaremos a favor da ideia de uma “incompatibilidade modal” entre os conceitos envolvidos, como eram antes do avanço, e o que se tornam após a obtenção do novo resultado. Também argumentaremos que a adoção dessa tese altera profundamente nossa maneira tradicional de construir a ideia de (...) “progresso” em matemática. (shrink)

Factors such as subsistence turnover, warfare, or interaction between different groups can be major sources of cultural change in human populations. Global demographic shifts such as the transition to agriculture during the Neolithic and more recently the urbanization and globalization of the twentieth century have been major catalysts for cultural change. Here, we test whether cultural traits such as patri/matrilocality and postmarital migration persist in the face of social upheaval and gene flow during the past 150 years in postcolonial South (...) Africa. The recent history of South Africa has seen major demographic shifts that resulted in the displacement and forced sedentism of indigenous Khoekhoe and San populations. During the expansion of the colonial frontier, the Khoe-San admixed with European colonists and enslaved individuals from West/Central Africa, Indonesia, and South Asia, introducing novel cultural norms. We conducted demographic interviews among Nama and Cederberg communities representing nearly 3,000 individuals across three generations. Despite the history of colonial expansion, and the subsequent incorporation of Khoe-San and Khoe-San-descendant communities into a colonial society with strong patrilocal norms, patrilocality is the least common postmarital residence pattern in our study populations today. Our results suggest that more recent forces of integration into the market economy are likely the primary drivers of change in the cultural traits examined in our study. Birthplace had a strong effect on an individual’s odds of migration, distance moved, and postmarital residence form. These effects are at least partially explained by the population size of the birthplace. Our results suggest that market factors local to birthplaces are important drivers of residence decisions, although the frequency of matrilocal residence and a geographic and temporal cline in migration and residence patterns also indicate the persistence of some historic Khoe-San cultural traits in contemporary groups. (shrink)

Review of the translation of Ludwig Wittgenstein book: Observações Filosóficas. São Paulo: Edições Loyola, 2005. Tradução (do inglês) por Adail Sobral e Maria Stela Gonçalves.

O presente texto versa sobre as utilizações políticas que a conversão dos grupos indígenas suscitou na fronteira amazônica. A fronteira a que aludimos aqui diz respeito aos rios Marañon, Solimões e Negro, onde os limites das colônias europeias se encontravam. Se por um lado havia o caráter espiritual, em reduzir os indígenas a fé católica, por outro, as conversões foram amplamente utilizadas pelos estados ibéricos para garantir sua zona de influência, além de garantir a supremacia econômica no vale amazônico. E (...) além dos ibéricos, a conversão foi uma política na qual os indígenas se aproveitaram para tirar vantagens da condição de “vassalo do rei”, que o fato de se tornar católico expressava. Desse modo, o presente trabalho dialoga com os estudos de fronteira, sobretudo, com a noção de Missão como instituição de fronteira, além do Protagonismo Indígena, em demonstrar a perspectiva dos grupos nativos, frente ao processo de conversão. (shrink)

Este artigo tem por objetivo compreender o papel representado pelo conceito de conatus na filosofia de Baruch de Spinoza. Partindo da leitura da da Ética III buscaremos reconstruir a teoria da afetividade postulada pelo filósofo para demonstrar como a noção de conatus opera ao mesmo tempo como perseveração na existência e afirmação do desejo. O passo posterior será projetar uma unidade entre o existir e o desejar como a base para o correto entendimento da concepção de liberdade desenvolvida por Spinoza (...) na parte V de sua Ética. (shrink)

Plutôt qu’un quatrième pouvoir, les médias constituent un contre-pouvoir à l’ensemble des acteurs sociaux, État inclus. Les relations entre eux sont donc naturellement tendues. Cela n’empêche pas l’État de confier des missions de quasi-« service public » à des instances privées dont il détermine les rôles sans in­ter­venir pour autant dans leur mise en œuvre. En Belgique francophone, c’est le cas du Conseil de déontologie journalistique, initiative d’autorégulation des médias, dont les activités s’articulent à celles du législatif, de l’exécutif et (...) du judi­ciaire. Cette complémentarité constitue non seulement la concrétisation d’un prin­cipe de philosophie politique, la subsidiarité, mais elle est aussi une garantie du respect de l’indépendance de ce contre-pouvoir. (shrink)